In a search and matching model with right-to-manage bargaining, matched workers and rms bargain over wages, given labor demand schedule of rms for hours worked per worker. Wages and hours worked per worker are determined as if they are determined in a competitive labor market with a distortion to wage markups. A positive ineciency gap in the labor market diminishes workers' eective bargaining power relative to rms, because rms can adjust labor input and wage schedule via intensive margin. The Hosios condition does not necessarily hold even when workers' actual bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity of matches.
INTRODUCTION
In the standard labor market search model based on ecient Nash bargaining, workers and rms bargain over both wages and hours worked per worker. Hosios (1990) showed that if workers' bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity of matches, the allocation in a decentralized economy is ecient. The marginal product of labor is equal to the marginal rate of substitution at an ecient level of hours worked per worker (intensive margin) as in the social planner's problem, and wage contracts with a particular share of surplus assures that wages are also at an ecient level. Thus the number of jobs (extensive margin) is also at an ecient level. In contrast, in recently investigations of right-to-manage bargaining, in which matched workers and rms bargain over wages, given labor demand schedule of rms for hours worked per worker, the properties of the model in terms of ineciencies in the labor market have not been studied.
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In this note, I describe properties of the labor market search model with the right-to-manage bargaining, as well as the implied ineciencies in the labor market. The most distinct feature I found is that wages and hours worked per worker are determined as if they are determined by demand and supply in a competitive labor market with a distortion to wage markups. A positive ineciency gap (Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido, 2007) in the labor market diminishes workers' eective bargaining power relative to rms because rms can adjust labor input and wage schedule via intensive margin. The Hosios condition does not necessarily hold even when workers' actual bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity of matches. Workers' bargaining power and wage markups are closely related to each other through ineciencies in the labor market.
In the next section, I present the model. Section 3 shows the results in steady state. Section 4 concludes.
MODEL
Time is discrete and innite, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., ∞. There is an innite mass of workers and rms.
Firms post vacancies to workers seeking jobs. Wages and hours worked per worker are de-1 The original contributions are found in Nickell and Andrews (1983) and Trigari (2006) . Christoel and Kuester (2008) and Christoel and Linzert (2010) studied ination dynamics of a version of the model with sticky price and monopolistic competition. Christoel and Kuester (2009) also examined the elasticity of unemployment with respect to rms' benets in the model. termined via right-to-manage bargaining (Nickell and Andrews, 1983; Trigari, 2006) , in which matched worker and rm bargain over wages, given labor's demand schedule of rms. The timing of events is as follows:
1. 1 − n t−1 is the measure of unemployed workers at the end of last period. A fraction of the employed workers ρn t−1 are exogenously separated:
(1) u t workers seek jobs in this period.
2. Firms post vacancies v t to match the unemployed workers u t by matching function m(u t , v t ), which exhibits constant returns to scale. The labor market tightness is given
Each worker and rm is as small as such the labor market tightness at the aggregate level is given for them. The job nding rate for workers s(θ t ) = m(u t , v t )/u t = m(1, θ t ) and the job lling rate for rms q(θ t ) = m(u t , v t )/v t = m(θ −1 t , 1) are also given for them.
3. The number of the newly employed workers is given by
Note that the newly employed workers can work immediately.
4. The employed workers enter into production
Each worker works h t hours and produces f (h t ) which is decreasing returns to scale in terms of hours worked per worker so that rms earn a positive prot period-by-period.
Total production is linear in n t .
Matching values for workers and rms are given by
where S t is the matching value for a marginal worker in terms of utility and J t is the matching value for a marginal job. Each Worker earns wage bill w t h t . A worker also has disutility of labor g(h t )/p t and forgone unemployed benets b. 1 − ρ(1 − s(θ t+1 )) employed workers continue to match with rms in the next period, and s(θ t+1 ) unemployed workers nd a job in the next period, thus their dierence is used as transition probability of net value of employment.
2 Each rm produces f (h t ) and pays wage bill w t h t . ρ jobs are exogenously separated in the next
is the price in terms of numeraire (log utility of household consumption is assumed). Free entry is assumed, i.e.,
The value of a job is equal to the vacancy posting cost c v times expected vacancy duration 1/q(θ t ).
Right-to-manage bargaining In right-to-manage bargaining, rms have control over hours worked per worker, and maximize the matching value for rms, i.e. ∂J t /∂h t = f (h t ) − w t = 0.
This condition can be solved for hours worked per worker, h t = f −1 (w t ) ≡ h(w t ). Given this labor demand schedule, workers and rms bargain over wages period-by-period so as to
, where η ∈ [0, 1] is workers' actual bargaining power. The rst-order necessary condition with respect to the wage is given by
The matching value for workers is decomposed into St ≡ Wt − Ut where
Employed workers obtain wage bill wtht, and remain in their job in the next period with probability 1 − ρ(1 − st+1). Unemployed workers have foregone labor disutility and unemployment benets g(ht)/pt + b, and nd a job in the next period with probability st+1.
is the wedge between the marginal values of matching and ε w = −h (w t )w t /h(w t ) > 1 is elasticity of labor demand. 3 By solving δ t for w t , I have the following labor market conditions:
where rms' labor demand schedule is given by (8). Also, through wage contracts between workers and rms, workers' labor supply schedule is given by (9). Wages and hours worked per worker are determined as if they are determined in a competitive labor market with a distortion to wage markups. However, the wage markups are determined endogenously here depending on the matching values of workers and rms; σ t = ε w /(ε w − 1 + δ t ) and
Finally, a general equilibrium is dened by equations (1)-(9).
Reservation wage bills are derived from S t ≥ 0 and J t ≥ 0
As long as the wage bill is in the set [ω t , ω t ], the continuity of matching is satised. Then, the wage equation is derived from equations (8)- (11):
where χ t = ηδ t /(1 − η + ηδ t ) is workers' eective bargaining power.
3 This is closely related to the labor wedge between marginal product of labor and marginal rate of substitution at individual level.
≡ mplt/mrst = 1 also holds. In contrast, in the ecient Nash bargaining, in which workers and rms bargain both wages and hours worked per worker, δt = 1∀t holds and no labor wedge exists at individual level. 4 Note that even if St/Jt is small, (1 − η)/η and δt = −(∂St/∂wt)/(∂Jt/∂wt) = [(1 − η)/η]St/Jt can be large. St/Jt is concave in wt; therefore when St/Jt is small, ∂St/∂wt is large relative to ∂Jt/∂wt and δt is large. See also the numerical example in section 3.
Eciency The social planner's problem is given by
where u t = 1 − n t−1 + ρn t−1 . First-order necessary conditions are
On the other hand, the implementability conditions in the decentralized economy are derived from (5)- (9):
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale matching function m(u t , v t ) = mu ξ t v 1−ξ t , m ut = ξm t /u t and m vt = (1 − ξ)m t /v t hold. Then I have a modied Hosios condition: ξ = η = χ t . Hosios (1990) showed that if workers' bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity of matches, the allocation in the decentralized economy as described above is at ecient level as in the social planner's problem. However, the standard Hosios condition does not necessarily hold; in general, η = χ and δ = 1 hold even in steady state. I will demonstrate it in section 3 too.
The role of workers' bargaining power In the right-to-manage bargaining, the workers' bargaining power is diminished because rms have control over hours worked per worker. Still, the workers' bargaining power plays an important role in the labor market. When the workers' actual bargaining power η is low, wages are lower than the marginal rate of substitution w t = mpl t < mrs t , and the marginal gain for workers by increase in wages is higher than the marginal loss for rms, i.e. ∂S t /∂w t = h t − h (w t )(mrs t − w t ) > h t = −∂J t /∂w t . 5 Thus δ t is high and σ t is low. On the contrary, when the workers' bargaining power is high, w t = mpl t > mrs t and ∂S t /∂w t < h t = ∂J t /∂w t hold, and δ t is low and σ t is high. As η → 1, the slope of the supply curve σ t becomes steeper and δ t approaches to zero. 6
Put dierently, the wage markup σ t and the wedge between the marginal values of matching δ t = −(∂S t /∂w t )/(∂J t /∂w t ) > 0 have an one-to-one correspondence: Wages are determined independently at w = w EB , and if the workers' bargaining power is equal to unemployment elasticity of matches, wages are also ecient at the point E 0 in gure 1, (w * , h * ). On the other hand, in right-to-manage bargaining, given labor demand schedule of rms, the bargaining process between workers and rms determines the labor supply schedule, which shifts with a varying wage markup σ t . The equilibrium is the intersection of demand and supply at the point E 1 in gure 1, (w RTM , h RTM ). When η is high, there is a positive ineciency gap in the labor market (Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido, 2007) , and a positive wage markup.
When η is low, there is a negative ineciency gap, which leads to a negative wage markup.
Also, the workers' eective bargaining power χ t is given as a function of δ t :
When η is high (low), a positive (negative) ineciency gap implies that the eective bargaining power χ t is lower (higher) than the actual bargaining power η, because rms have control over 5 In the standard ecient bargaining, ∂St/∂wt = −∂Jt/∂wt = ht holds, and marginal gain and loss by increase in wages are always the same for workers and rms. 6 Note that when η = 1, ∂St/∂wt = ht + wth (wt) − mrsth (wt) = 0 ⇔ wt = [εw/(εw − 1)]mrst holds.
hours worked per worker and rms can aect on the outcome of bargaining by adjusting labor demand via intensive margin. Thus, because of ineciencies in the labor market, the Hosios condition does not necessarily hold.
[ Figure 1 is inserted here]
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE IN STEADY STATE
To further investigate the steady state relationship, functional forms are assumed as follows: 
where
Note that under standard assumptions on parameters, β, ρ, s, α, b w are in (0, 1) and φ > 0, B > 0 and C > 0 hold. 7 Then I can show
η ∈ (0, 1) also holds.
If (1 + φ)(1 − b w ) > α, the workers' period-by-period gain from bargaining is positive, which is required for incentive compatibility for workers to hold.
9 In this case, wages and hours worked 7 s = m/u = ρn/(1 − n + ρn) is a function of ρ and n = 1 −ũ, whereũ is the steady state unemployment at the end of the period. Steady state calculation is found in the appendix. 9 Otherwise,δ < 0 and S/J < 0 hold. Note
per worker are determined at the intersection of demand (8) 10 I follow the calibration strategy in Christoel and Kuester (2008; 2009) , which is found in the appendix. 11η is a function of the parameters other than ξ and η, therefore ξ = η =η can be chosen if the other parameters are xed. This is more restricted than in the standard case with ecient Nash bargaining, where ξ = η can be chosen freely regardless of the other parameters. Notes: EB denotes allocation in ecient Nash bargaining. RTM denotes allocation in right-to-manage bargaining. * denotes allocation at the social optimum. The parameter values other than η are xed at β = 0.998, ρ = 0.03, α = 0.95, φ = 2, b w = 0.4, and ξ = 0.5. The length of period is a month, and parameters are chosen to match steady state unemployment rate after matching 1 − n = 0.06 and job nding rate q = 0.3306 in the U.S. labor market, which implies s = 0.2126 and c v = 0.047y.
